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ABSTRACT
In 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson established a special committee to
investigate allegations of misconduct by American POW’s during the Korean War. The
Communists had used the prisoners for propaganda purposes and extended the battlefield
into the POW camp as never before. The committee proposed the Code of Conduct as a
means of preventing similar occurrences in future conflicts.
The Code of Conduct puts into words, for the first time, concepts which had
evolved from the experiences of American POW’s in the almost 200 years of combat
preceding its development. Americans who became POW’s during conflicts after the
implementation of the Code have identified its strengths and weaknesses. One of the
strengths of the Code is its plain wording. It was put into language that all soldiers could
understand. One of the great weaknesses of the Code is the lack of training given to most
soldiers, yet the committee that drafted the Code identified training as an essential
element to its success.
Another serious weakness is the failure of the military to adapt the Code to the
current world situation where mid- and high-intensity conflict are less probable than lowintensity conflict or operations other than war. Because of the inherently different
enemies faced in those situations, the training should be changed to reflect the
differences.
The Code of Conduct was drafted in order to benefit soldiers. Accordingly, Code
of Conduct training should be revamped to accurately reflect the potential POW scenarios
facing America’s fighting men and women.

iv

INTRODUCTION

The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the
courage and conduct of this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy
leaves us only the choice of brave resistance or the most abject
submission. We have, therefore, to resolve to conquer or die.1

General George Washington spoke these words to members of the Continental
Army on August 27, 1776, prior to the Battle of Long Island. He undoubtedly was
referring to dependence on the courage and conduct of the army while engaged in
combat with the enemy. These same traits were just as essential for those soldiers taken
prisoner by the British during that battle and the thousands of American servicemen
captured during the more than 220 years of conflicts since Washington’s address to his
troops.
Since our country’s struggle for independence, American fighting men, and
more recently women, have become prisoners of war (POW’s). Their treatment has
varied widely. Some of the worst treatment occurred at the hands of other Americans
during the American Civil War. In spite of the many conflicts in which Americans
became POW’s, there was no formal, standardized guidance on how captives should
behave until Executive Order 10631 – Code of Conduct for members of the Armed
Forces of the United States was signed by President Dwight Eisenhower on August 17,
1955. The Code of Conduct has been amended twice since its creation. Paragraph V
was changed by Executive Order 12017, November 3, 1977, to require a POW to give
name, rank, service number, and date of birth. The references to male gender in
1
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Paragraphs I, II, and VI were removed by Executive Order 12633, March 28, 1988. The
Code’s original purpose of providing guidance to POW’s, however, has remained
unchanged.
President Eisenhower directed the creation of the Code of Conduct, as it is
commonly referred to, in response to the experience of American POW’s during the
Korean War. The Code of Conduct dictates that members of the armed forces will
receive training to help them counter and withstand all enemy efforts to force them to
collaborate or divulge information and instruction as to the behavior and obligations
expected of them during combat or captivity. American soldiers have tested the Code
of Conduct in many conflicts since its implementation, with differing degrees of
success. Although the Code of Conduct is not perfect, it provides American POW’s a
touchstone by which they can live.
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on American POW’s captured in conflicts
prior to the Korean War. It discusses their experiences, many of the laws and
regulations which governed their treatment, and the evolution of American policy that
occurred with regards to POW’s from the American Revolution through the Second
World War.
Chapter 2 examines the POW situation during the Korean War. The Communist
Chinese successfully used prisoners for propaganda purposes by eliciting statements
from them. Because of these pro-communist statements by American servicemen, the
Army began an investigation into the conduct of POW’s before the end of the war.
That investigation ultimately resulted in the creation of the Code of Conduct.

2

The implementation of the Code of Conduct in American hostilities since its
creation is the subject of Chapter 3. By far the largest group of POW’s resulted from
America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. However, Americans were captured in the
Gulf War, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. The Code of Conduct training these
POW’s received varied widely and the success they had in adhering to the Code of
Conduct has varied just as widely. To ensure better compliance with the Code of
Conduct, the United States military must implement the more rigorous training program
envisioned by the drafters of the Code.
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CHAPTER 1
AMERICAN POW’S PRIOR TO THE KOREAN WAR
Until 1955, American servicemen received no uniform orders or training
concerning their behavior if taken prisoner of war. The United States’ attitude towards
POW’s, both how our POW’s should act and how POW’s captured by the United
States’ military should be treated, evolved during the many conflicts experienced by the
country. The Civil War and both World Wars significantly contributed to development
of a national and an international standard of treatment required with respect to POW’s.
However, American soldiers continued to become POW’s with little preparation for the
ordeal they were to face. This was due, in large part, to the fact that most nations of the
world viewed POW’s as non-combatants whose participation in the conflict was
terminated. They would remain in captivity until the end of hostilities and then be
repatriated to their homeland. The Chinese use of American POW’s as propaganda
objects during the Korean War changed this attitude forever.
The American POW experience began during the struggle for independence
from Great Britain. The British treated the forces of the Continental Army and Navy as
criminals rather than as POW’s.2 They imprisoned a majority of the Americans aboard
prison ships, or hulks, in American harbors like Wallabout Bay, New York, or
transported them to prisons in England or Ireland. The British government enacted
Lord North’s Act of 1777, which legalized the British view of the Americans as rebels
on land and pirates on the sea, thereby giving the British judicial system jurisdiction
over any Americans who were captured.3 The conditions experienced in both the prison

2
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hulks and military prisons in England and Ireland were deplorable. An estimated 7,000
American POW’s died in the British prison hulks.4
At one point, in January 1777, General George Washington, commander of the
Continental Army, wrote to British General Sir William Howe to protest the treatment
of American prisoners. Washington demanded to know if Howe was “determined to
make captivity as distressing as possible, [if so] let me know it, that we may be upon
equal terms, for your conduct must and shall mark mine.”5 That spring, Washington
refused to send back healthy British soldiers after the British released 2,200 American
prisoners in such a pitiful state that many died and most others were hospitalized, unfit
for any military duty.6 Washington’s capture of Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown forced
the British into an exchange of prisoners, saving many prisoners who had been taken to
England and Ireland.7
During the Revolutionary War, generally speaking, once taken prisoner by either
side, a prisoner could expect release only as a result of a prisoner exchange. A limited
exception to this rule was that of “parole.” Both sides recognized the granting of parole
to POW’s, normally officers. Parole was a military custom of giving one’s word of
honor to abide by certain conditions in exchange for some degree of freedom from
confinement.8 Because the parole system depended upon enforcing the word of the
individual officer, General Washington mandated strict compliance by any officer

4
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accepting parole. The Code of Conduct now specifically prohibits members of the
armed forces from accepting parole or special favors from the enemy.
During the War of 1812, American soldiers and sailors again fell into British
hands. However, this time the British recognized American sovereignty and treated
most of the 14,000 captives as POW’s, designating as traitors only individuals who had
emigrated from Britain to the United States.9 Once again, both sides allowed officers to
accept parole. Because of disputes such as the British claims that British prisoners who
were put on a neutral vessel or dropped at a neutral port by American captors were not
on parole but had been released outright, both countries negotiated a series of
conventions in 1812 and 1813 that bound them to treat prisoners “with humanity,
conformable to the usage and practice of the most civilized nations during war.”10
Although never ratified by Britain, both countries generally adhered to the conventions.
Despite the 1812 and 1813 conventions, not all the Americans were well treated.
At the end of the war, descriptions of mistreatment experienced by Americans in Britain
fueled feeling of anglophobia.11 Many American POW’s were taken to Dartmoor
Prison, at Princeton, Devonshire, England. Although the War of 1812 officially ended
on February 17, 1815, with the ratification of the treaty of Ghent, many Americans
remained in Dartmoor Prison because the United States was unable to agree with the
British about who should transport the prisoners back to the United States. On April 6,
1815, almost two months after the end of hostilities, five Americans were killed and
thirty-four wounded at Dartmoor when they rebelled at being held after the end of the

9
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War.12 The hatred felt by Americans toward Britain because of the treatment of
American POW’s lasted for many years.
More than thirty years later, America was at war with Mexico. The Mexicans
treated most of the American fighting men from Regular Army and volunteer units as
POW’s. They were kept in Mexico City and many accepted parole.13 The Texans who
were captured, however, were not treated as well. Because of the hatred between the
Mexicans and Texans caused by more than ten years of conflict, Mexican General Santa
Anna had directed that the Texans be executed shortly after capture. This was an
extension of his policy during the War of Texas Independence. Santa Anna had
persuaded the Mexican Congress to pass a decree in December 1835 announcing that all
foreigners taken in armed conflict against the Mexican government would be treated as
pirates and shot.14 Santa Anna proceeded to order the execution of the survivors of the
Alamo in March 1836, and 390 soldiers under Colonel James Fannin only weeks later at
Goliad.15 Fannin negotiated his surrender at Goliad with Mexican General Jose´ de
Urrea, one of Santa Anna’s subordinates. Urrea told Fannin that there was no known
instance of a soldier who trusted the clemency of the Mexican government losing his
life and that he would recommend to Santa Anna that Fannin and his soldiers be treated
as prisoners of war. Fannin surrendered his command based on Urrea’s assurances, but
Santa Anna refused to treat the Americans at Goliad as POW’s and ordered Urrea to
comply with the December 30 decree. Except for twenty-eight escapees, Fannin’s men
faced firing squads on Palm Sunday, March 27, 1836.

12
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Americans next became POW’s to other Americans. The Union and
Confederate Armies both took large numbers of POW’s, but neither side was
adequately prepared to take care of them. Although estimates vary, approximately
215,000 Confederates and 194,000 Federals fell prisoner. Of these numbers,
approximately 12 percent of Confederates and 15.5 percent of Federals died while being
held.16
The fact that the United States government did not recognize the Confederacy as
a legal entity, but only the result of an armed insurrection, raised questions about the
status of captured Confederate soldiers. If the United States were to treat them as
POW’s, it might be seen as an acknowledgement of the Confederacy as a legal
government and encourage other countries to do the same. However, if the United
States did not treat Confederate captives as POW’s, it could not expect the Confederacy
to extend prisoner of war status to Union captives. Even prior to the Geneva
Conventions, the customs of war recognized at the time afforded to POW’s rights that
criminals, as the Confederate soldiers would otherwise be considered, would not enjoy.
The United States faced the dilemma of obtaining POW status for its soldiers while not
recognizing the Confederate insurrection. Army Regulation Article XXXVI, which was
in effect at the beginning of the war, ultimately resolved the issue.17 It provided for the
taking of prisoners, the treatment of prisoners’ private property, and the exchange and
parole policies of the United States Government. Article XXXVI extended POW status
to Confederate soldiers while not legitimizing the Confederacy. More importantly,
through the use of Article XXXVI, the Union was able to obtain POW treatment for its

16
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soldiers in that the Confederate Army adopted similar provisions soon after the start of
the war.
Many of the United State's concepts regarding the treatment of POW’s were the
result of the work of Francis Lieber. President Lincoln asked Lieber, a German-born
law professor at Columbia College in New York, to draft a code governing the Union
Army's conduct in the field. 18 The result was Lieber's April 1863, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States, sometimes referred to as the Lieber Code.19
The Lieber Code defined POW’s as “a public enemy armed or attached to the
hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or
wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by individual surrender or by capitulation
(Article 49).20 Lieber also extended POW status to citizens accompanying the army,
such as sutlers, reporters of journals or contractors and the monarchs and members of a
hostile reigning family and chief officers of a hostile government and its diplomatic
agents, if captured on belligerent ground and if not provided with safe conduct granted
by the captor’s government (Article 50).21
Once the United States began to recognize Confederates as POW’s, the next
issue was how to treat Confederate POW’s properly and how to repatriate Union
prisoners. On July 22, 1862, the two governments entered into a Prisoner Exchange
Cartel which defined the basis for exchange of POW’s.22 Although the Cartel was in
effect from its signing until the end of the war, except for a brief period in 1863 and
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1864, it was not the sole means of exchanging prisoners. Local commanders had great
discretion to enter into exchanges with enemy counterparts and exercised that option
immediately following battles.
The American Civil War was the last conflict in which American POW’s were
paroled in large numbers. Just as during the Revolutionary war, parole was another
means by which captors released prisoners. The Union and Confederacy exercised
various classifications of parole, some of which international law did not recognize.
The United States Army even published General Order No. 207 to prevent commanders
from confusing a “military parole” with a “parole of honor.”23 A military parole was, in
essence, only a simple one-for-one exchange of prisoners, which required a soldier not
to serve until exchanged for another prisoner; but a parole of honor required the
prisoner’s oath to do or not do something, usually to not bear arms against the enemy
for the remainder of the conflict. The Code of Conduct, which directs American
servicemen to accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy, rendered that
distinction moot.
The Lieber Code defined parole as “ the pledge of individual good faith and
honor to do, or to omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his parole shall have been
dismissed, wholly or partially, from the power of the captor.”24 At the beginning of the
conflict, General Winfield Scott directed the parole oath to be used when Confederate
officers were given parole.25 Although often used at the beginning of the war, paroles
became less common as the war continued. In 1863, the United States policy of
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paroling prisoners gradually changed. Recognizing that the war had become one of
attrition, federal authorities stopped exchanging and paroling Confederate POW’s in
order to deprive the Confederate Army of services of the soldiers.26 The unintended
result of this policy change was the retaliatory termination of exchanges and paroles by
the Confederate government, which precluded the release of many Union POW’s from
Confederate prisons. This undoubtedly resulted in the deaths of an unknown number of
Union prisoners, based upon the approximately 15 percent mortality rate experienced by
Union prisoners in Confederate prisons.27
Another reason the Union halted the parole exchanges was because Union
soldiers were using the system to their advantage. A number of Union conscripts
allegedly surrendered at the first opportunity. They would then give their parole and
evade further military service.28 Parole has not played a significant factor for American
POW’s in any conflict since the American Civil War.
American soldiers next fell prisoner to soldiers of Kaiser Wilhelm II of
Germany. America entered the war on April 6, 1917, almost three years after the
conflict had begun. In the nineteen months the American Expeditionary Force fought,
4,480 doughboys were taken prisoner of war.29 The attitude of America, and the world,
with respect to POW’s had changed drastically in the fifty years since the end of the
Civil War. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had provided rules for the
treatment of POW’s. It was the first written document to detail an internationally
recognized standard regarding the treatment of POW’s, many of which are still in place
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today. It required captured soldiers to be paid for their labor (Article 6), to give their
true name and rank (Article 9), and to enjoy complete liberty in the exercise of their
religion (Article 18).30 The United States was a signatory to the Hague Convention of
1907. In 1914, the American military formally adopted the Hague rules and
incorporated them into the 1914 version of the Rules of Land Warfare.31 Encompassed
in the 1914 rules was a major modification of American policy regarding parole. Policy
had often changed in the past, mainly with the level of command at which parole could
be granted. The matter was settled by taking the power to parole away from local
commanders and retaining it at the highest levels of command. This policy is still in
place today.
Although the United States military had no Code of Conduct at that time,
American soldiers often received guidance on how to act if captured. Instructions from
the 37th Division advised soldiers that it was only necessary to give their name and
rank.32 If they must talk, they should act as if they knew nothing specific about the
tactical situation. But the Division Instruction clearly emphasized that remaining silent
was best. “Refuse to talk,” it admonished. “If you do talk, and give the enemy
information, you are traitors to your country and worse than all, traitors to your own
pals.”33
The Germans generally treated American POW’s in a manner consistent with
the laws of war. Two hundred soldiers of the 27th Division, a New York National
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Guard unit called to active service for the war, were taken prisoner.34 They reported
that the Germans treated them as well as could be expected; considering the situation in
Germany at the end of the war. However, the soldiers who became prisoner from the
107th Infantry Regiment, part of the 27th Division, recorded their hatred for those
Germans who had lived in the United States and who constantly attempted to converse
with them about places and events in the United States.35 It is possible the Germans
chose these individuals as guards because of their knowledge of the English language
and they expected those guards would be able to gain more information from the
prisoners because of their shared experience of living in America. Whatever the
reasoning, the tactic did not work.
Less than thirty years later, American troops were again fighting in another
world war. Germans took over 93,000 Americans captive during World War II36 and
the Japanese captured approximately 25,000.37 All of the belligerents, except the Soviet
Union and Japan, had signed the Geneva Convention of 1929, which further regulated
the treatment of POW’s.38 Among other things, it stipulated that prisoners who
attempted to escape would not be severely punished.
The Germans endeavored to gain information from their prisoners through
various interrogation techniques. They often used solitary confinement to break down a
prisoner physically and emotionally.39 They also used the "good cop, bad cop"
technique. A fanatical Nazi would begin the interrogation and would be interrupted by

34

Major General John F. O’Ryan, The Story of the 27th Division, 489.
Gerald F. Jacobson, History of the 107th Infantry U.S. A., 271.
36
Doyle, A Prisoner’s Duty, 143.
37
Lee Kennett, G.I., the American Soldier in World War II, 184.
38
Doyle, A Prisoner’s Duty, 144.
39
David A. Foy, For You the War is Over, 56.
35

13

a meek interrogator, who would try to befriend the prisoner. The Germans also used a
"false escape" scheme.40 They would strip a prisoner of all identification and arrange a
situation, which allowed the prisoner to escape. They would follow him for a period of
time and then recapture him. Because he had no paperwork or identification, he would
be treated as a spy and threatened with being shot unless he gave the Germans the
information they desired.
On the whole, German soldiers again treated American POW’s humanely, as
they had in World War I, in accordance with the Geneva and Hague Conventions. This
was a result of not only the application of the Conventions, which Red Cross inspectors
monitored, but also of letters from German POW’s in the United States who wrote
home about the good treatment they were receiving. However, the Germans did treat
different classes of prisoners differently.
As a general rule, officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, usually
fared better in German hands than did other American prisoners because the Germans
had a high regard for those they considered professional soldiers. This was borne out
by the usually good treatment experienced by Army Air Corps prisoners, most of whom
were officers41
Many prisoners of actual or believed Jewish descent faced harsher conditions.
Although the Germans had originally treated the Jewish prisoners the same as they had
treated all others, this changed towards the end of the war. In January 1945, the
Germans transferred approximately 350 American prisoners from a POW camp named
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Bad Orb to the death camp Berga-Elster.42 Of these prisoners, only 150 were Jewish;
the other 200 had Jewish names, were troublemakers, or were circumcised, which the
Germans thought was the mark of a Jew.43
The varying treatment of POW’s based on different classification of prisoners
illustrates one of the difficulties of enacting a single code that all POW’s must obey.
Their captors may treat prisoners of different ranks, ethnic backgrounds or sex
differently. A Japanese-American soldier captured by the Japanese could probably
expect to receive even harsher treatment from his captors than his fellow Caucasian
captive. Communists targeted black POW’s in both the Korean and Vietnamese wars
for special, preferential treatment. They attempted to convince the black prisoners that
they were being used by a racist, white American society to kill Asians who were
fighting for their freedom and that of other oppressed people of the world.44
Just as they had in World War I, American POW’s in World War II felt a special
hatred for German guards who had lived in the United States before the war. The Green
Hornet, a German guard at Stalag Number 4, boasted that he owned land in Wyoming
and that he had once lived there. Although he was an easygoing guard, he was a target
of special antagonism because the prisoners felt they were, “… defending that land for
him, so he has no goddam business being in the kraut army.”45 The German ploy of
gaining the friendship of American prisoners through the use of German-American
guards again failed.
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Americans captured by the Japanese in the Pacific Theater were not so fortunate.
The Japanese were extremely abusive in their treatment of Allied POW’s. Executions,
beatings, and starvation were commonplace. Held accountable for these atrocities after
the war, a number of Japanese military personnel, including eighteen in the Philippines,
received death sentences.
The Japanese had not always had that attitude toward POW’s. Army Instruction
No. 22 of the Japanese Army Regulation for Handling POW’s, dated February 1904,
had stated that, “POW’s shall be treated with a spirit of goodwill and shall never be
subjected to cruelties or humiliation.”46 However, this attitude began to change after
World War I when the Japanese officer corps began to assert its control over the
Japanese government and implement the spirit of traditional Bushido, the distinctive
mark of honor among the Samurai.47 The Japanese military turned from following
Army Instruction No. 22 and adopted the Military Field Code in 1941, which required
absolute obedience to superiors, complete acceptance of Japan’s military and moral
superiority, and suicide in place of an honorable surrender.48 The Japanese feeling of
superiority and contempt for those who had surrendered led to their abuses of the Allied
POW’s.
The Japanese also used Koreans as guards for the Americans. The Japanese
conscripted the Koreans into the army but never considered them as equals.49 Although
some of the Korean guards treated the American prisoners leniently because of their
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shared hatred for the Japanese, many took out their anger at the Japanese on the only
ones they could - the Allied prisoners.
James Clavell, the writer-director-producer who spent three years as a prisoner
of war in various Japanese prisoner camps in the Far East, details the interaction of
Allied prisoners with their Korean guards in his novel King Rat.50 The novel also
describes the "survival of the fittest" attitude adopted by the most successful prisoners.
Modern portrayals of American POW’s in many of America's conflicts also
emphasize that theme. In the television mini-series Andersonville (1996), Union
prisoners tried, convicted and subsequently hanged some of their fellow prisoners. The
condemned prisoners had banded together and began abusing other prisoners, robbing
them of their food, shelter, and generally taking advantage of those weaker than
themselves or individuals who could not overcome their superior numbers. In Stalag 17
(1953), a movie about American POW’s in Germany during World War II, William
Holden portrayed an American prisoner of war who does business with the German
guards in order to make his own life easier. His trades with the guards provided him
with better food, clothing, and cigarettes than that of his fellow prisoners. When it
became apparent that someone within the camp was supplying the Germans with
information, he became the likely suspect. The movie ended with Holden having to
find the true spy, a German who had earlier lived in the United States and was posing as
a prisoner. The films suggested that the GI who did whatever it took to survive but did
not totally break faith with his fellow prisoners was engaged in acceptable behavior.
Hollywood’s depiction of American prisoners is the only exposure to the POW issue the
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majority of the American public ever had. It is likely that when Stalag 17 was released
in 1953, almost simultaneously with the release of the majority of the POW’s of the
Korean War, many Americans identified the returning POW’s with the character played
by William Holden; i.e., they were just normal Americans who had done their best as
POW’s to survive a terrible ordeal.
Following World War II, the representatives of various nations of the world met
to draft international conventions to regulate the conduct of warfare. This was in
response to the horrific loss of life, of both combatants and non-combatants,
experienced during the war. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 evolved from the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Convention Between the United States of
America and Other Powers, Relating to Prisoners of War which was signed in Geneva
on July 27, 1929 and ratified by the United States Congress on February 4, 1932.
The four Conventions, drafted in 1949, covered the treatment of the wounded
and sick in armed forces in the field, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of
armed forces at sea; prisoners of war, and civilian persons in time of war.51 The
Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war is the source of the requirement that
prisoners provide their captors with name, rank, date of birth and service number
(Article 17).52 Although signed in 1949, the Conventions did not take effect until
October 21, 1950.
The inherent flaw with the Conventions, as with all attempts to regulate
behavior in times of war, was the ability to ensure compliance. There was no
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mechanism to force a nation to adopt the Conventions and, if they were adopted, to
force a signatory to comply with them. For example, North Korea violated the precept
of international law of war regarding the initiation of hostilities by attacking South
Korea with no prior warning.53 It should not have been a surprise, therefore, that the
North Koreans subsequently violated the international laws of war regarding POW’s.
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CHAPTER 2
AMERICAN POW’S IN THE KOREAN WAR
The American military was totally unprepared for combat in Korea in June
1950. The great fighting force that had defeated the Axis powers had been decimated
by the wholesale demobilization following World War II. The American troops in the
Far East consisted mainly of occupation troops and conducted very little combat
training. Those stationed in Korea were advisors to the Republic of Korea (ROK)
military and were not assigned to American combat units. In July 1949, the United
States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea consisted of 472 personnel. 54
General Douglas MacArthur had established American military control over all
Korea south of the 38th Parallel by proclamation on September 7, 1945.55 President
Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin had agreed in principal to this division of the
Korean peninsula at their conference in Yalta in February. Although many Koreans
wanted reunification of their country, the emerging cold war between the United States
and the Soviet Union prevented this. During the next four years, the United States
began preparations for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. These
preparations included the creation of a South Korean military and government, with the
hope the country would be able to withstand North Korean aggression without
American assistance.56
American troops deployed to South Korea from their occupation bases in Japan
after the North Korean attack. They almost immediately had to conduct a fighting
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retreat. Task Force Smith, named for its thirty-four year old commander Charles
Bradley Smith, was under-strength and poorly equipped. It was composed of 406 men
of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division whose mission was to
stop the advancing North Korean army in order to allow the South Korean army to
regroup. Each man had only 120 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition and two days
of C-Rations. The Task Force had two 75mm recoilless guns, two 4.2-inch mortars and
a number of 2.36-inch bazookas, which had already proved worthless against the Soviet
tanks used by the North Koreans.57 In less than one contact with the enemy, which
lasted forty-eight hours, Task Force Smith was no longer an effective combat force.
It did not take long for the effects of inadequate training to reveal themselves. On July
9, 1950, only days after American ground forces began engagements with the North
Koreans, a captured American Army officer made a 900-word broadcast on the enemy's
behalf over a Seoul radio station. "We did not know at all the cause of the war and the
real state of affairs, and were compelled to fight against the people of Korea,” he
stated.58 Although the statement was probably accurate; i.e., few soldiers knew why
North Korea had invaded South Korea and they were compelled to fight against North
Korea by the Army, the officer obviously was assisting the North Koreans, which was
in clear violation of the military prohibition against giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. This problem seemed to worsen in following days. According to a Pyongyang
radio broadcast, 117 American POW’s had declared that they had never wanted to fight
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for South Korea and had done so only because "President Truman dreams of world
domination."59
Approximately six weeks later, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and President of
the United Nations Security Council, Jacob A. Malik, presented a message to the
Security Council allegedly signed by thirty-eight American POW’s. The message
stated that the war had begun because of an “unprovoked and ill-advised invasion," by
South Korean troops, that American aircraft were attacking “nonmilitary targets," and
that the United States "should and must withdraw its forces from Korea."60 The New
York Times spoke for general public opinion when it immediately labeled Malik’s
“obviously fraudulent" communication "a new low even for Soviet tactics."61
Army leaders, perplexed by the signs of collaboration early in the conflict,
ordered the collection of information on all American POW’s. That process began late
in the summer of 1950 and continued until the summer of 1955, almost two years after
the last prisoners returned to the United States.62 The military used the resultant
information in what became an extensive debate regarding the conduct of POW’s in
Korea. The Army reported on May 5, 1953, that a small group of prisoners "who have
shown symptoms of having succumbed to Communist indoctrination" would be taken to
an Army hospital for "special consideration."63 The investigation, which ultimately
resulted in the appointment of a committee to develop a Code of Conduct for American
troops, had the difficult tasks of determining what, if any, misconduct individual
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prisoners had committed during their captivity and then make recommendations as to
how best handle those whose actions had failed to comply with an unwritten standard of
conduct for POW’s.
The military services disagreed about proper handling of the collaborators – and
public opinion varied as well. Ultimately, the Army was the only service to courtmartial any of its personnel for acts committed during captivity. The Navy found no
evidence of wrongdoing on the part of its prisoners; the Air Force administratively
separated seven and accepted the resignations of three, based on evidence of varying
degrees of wrongdoing; and the Marine Corps reprimanded one and placed two on
“restrictive assignments.”64
The American public was not sure what to do with the returning prisoners,
either the so-called “reactionaries,” as the Communists labeled those who refused to
bow to the pressure of their captors, or the “progressives,” those who were accused of
collaborating with the Communists.65 The Chinese Communists used skilled
psychologists to choose prisoners who would be most susceptible to indoctrination.
Most Americans seemed to conclude that the prisoners who had collaborated had done
so because they wanted better treatment and not because Communist indoctrination had
actually convinced them that Communism was a better system of governing than a
democratic one. The military also received some of the blame for failing to prepare its
soldiers for a possible POW experience. Many Americans believed that military
authorities should have known that the Communists would not abide by the Geneva
Conventions regarding POW’s and should have provided a policy for service members
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to follow in case of capture. The media and public also disagreed with the military’s
decision, especially the Army’s, to punish soldiers almost two years after the war
without having put a policy into place to prevent such a situation from occurring during
the next conflict.66 Such criticisms helped to prompt the creation of the Code of
Conduct.
The investigation of POW’s in the Korean conflict pointed to a breakdown in
the traditional system of Army command discipline, attributed to the Army’s acceptance
of the so-called Doolittle Report of 1945. That report had recommended fewer barriers
between officers and enlisted men and withdrew much of the power of the
noncommissioned officer. The Army instituted many of the reforms, which were
oriented toward removing arbitrary distinctions in dress and privileges between officers
and enlisted personnel, but failed to address the fundamental underlying issue of how to
build mutual respect up and down the military hierarchy.67 Unlike the Army POW’s,
the overall performance of Marine Corps POW’s, according to investigators, was
superior, a result in large part of the discipline, taut training methods, and higher morale
found within the Marine Corps.68
Not all Americans were sympathetic toward those accused of being
progressives. Senator Richard B. Russell, a Democrat from Georgia, felt the
Department of Defense was not condemning collaboration in unequivocal terms. He
blasted the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, for a statement Wilson made

66

William Lowe, “Justice, for a Tortured GI?” Look, (June 28, 1955), 32.
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/borden/wp/Ch12.pdf, 295.
68
“Why GI’s Folded,” Newsweek, (January 26, 1959), 104.
67

24

concerning the prisoners who had collaborated. Said Wilson,

We do not as a general principle condone those who made false confessions
contrary to the interests of their country, or whose actions caused their fellow
prisoners added misery. Such cases will be carefully and sympathetically
examined by the services concerned to ascertain whether in any of them there
has been an unreasonable failure to measure up to the standard of individual
conduct which is expected even of a prisoner of war or deviations from standards
of behavior prescribed by law. 69
Russell was upset because of a press report in which a U.N. Command spokesman had
announced that "being a 'progressive' - Red sympathizer- is not considered a crime in
the United States."70 The senator suggested that if the Department of Defense did not
distinguish between the soldiers who resisted and those who collaborated with the
enemy, it would have a disastrous effect upon the will of American servicemen to fight
and resist in future wars. Representative Robert L. Sikes, a Democrat from Florida,
supported Senator Russell’s views, calling for punishment of “turncoat G.I.s who
played the Reds’ tune while they were captives.”71
Other Congressmen saw things differently. Representative Francis Bolton, a
Republican from Ohio, was “deeply disturbed” when the Army preferred charges
against Corporal Edward Dickenson. “Let’s be human beings in these things,” she
pleaded. Another Republican Representative, William C. Wampler of Virginia, vowed
to intercede with the Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, on Corporal
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Dickenson’s behalf. Wampler described him as a “mere country boy victimized by a
shrewd propaganda technique” and he recommended that the Army “drop the matter.”72
Whatever the opinions of other services or the American public, the Army
proceeded in the court-martial of fourteen soldiers. The trials resulted in eleven
convictions and three acquittals.73 The charges against the fourteen included: informing
on fellow prisoners, collaborating in some manner with the enemy, misconduct as a
prisoner of war, assault on an officer, larceny, and murder. The Army charged some
soldiers of only one of the above offenses and others with multiple offenses. The
sentences imposed ranged from life imprisonment to a reprimand and being held at a
current rank for two years. The Board of Review of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army or the commanding officer who had directed the courts-martial later reduced five
of the sentences.
One of the prisoners convicted was Sergeant James C. Gallagher. Among other
charges, Sergeant Gallagher was found guilty of murdering three other captives by
forcibly ejecting them from their place of shelter and leaving them to die of exposure.
In another instance, he administered a severe beating to a fellow prisoner, whose
identity remains unknown, suspended him from a hook on the wall for a while before
shoving him into the freezing cold, resulting in his death.74 “I made a promise to that
kid [i.e., the unknown prisoner], to his God, to my God and to myself that the man who
murdered him would be brought to justice,” one of Sergeant Gallagher’s accusers
testified. “That is the man.” Another witness testified that the sergeant had thrown
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sick men into the subzero cold “like a bartender tossing a drunk.”75 Gallagher received
a life sentence for his crimes.
Another soldier initially sentenced to life in prison was Corporal Claude
Batchelor, who was convicted of two charges of informing on fellow prisoner and three
charges of collaborating with the enemy.76 Batchelor’s sentence was much stiffer than
that given to Corporal Edward Dickenson, who received a ten-year sentence, and that of
Lieutenant Colonel Harry Fleming, who was ordered dismissed from the Army with
forfeiture of his pay and allowances.77 The chairman of the Big Spring, Texas, draft
board resigned in protest when he learned of Batchelor’s sentence. “My conscience will
not let me be a part of drafting young men who might later be subject to the severe
punishment that was rendered Corporal Claude Batchelor,” he declared.78 Negative
public opinion led the Army to reduce Batchelor’s sentence to a maximum term of
twenty years.
Although some Americans believed the trials were necessary to maintain good
order and discipline in the military, the dominant opinion was that the returning
prisoners, after suffering months or years in the hands of a cruel enemy, were being
punished for doing only that which most people would have done. The American
media predominately portrayed the soldiers in a sympathetic light. Each trial brought
more negative publicity for the Army, which was characterized as an oppressive bully
picking on pathetic former prisoners. This negative publicity was largely responsible
for the decision to handle thirty-five cases administratively, rather than criminally, a
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process much quicker and less public than a court-martial trial.79 The Army eventually
bowed to both public and political pressure and chose the administrative method rather
than risk further criticism.
The American public did not sympathize with all of the former POW’s,
especially the twenty-one POW’s who refused repatriation to the United States
following the armistice. Initially, there had been twenty-three who refused but,
Corporal Dickenson and Sergeant Batchelor, asked for repatriation within
approximately three months of Operation Big Switch.80 America wanted answers as to
why young American men whose average age was just over twenty-three - the oldest
was thirty-one and the youngest was twenty - would refuse to return to the United
States. In the public’s view, they were not only rejecting the United States, but were
embracing America’s global enemy. There were many easy answers which explained
their conduct: they were afraid of prosecution for acts committed while in captivity;
they had Communist leanings prior to going to Korea; they were weak-willed and
defective in character; or the Communists had developed a “brainwashing” technique
which prevented them from exercising free will.
The idea that American prisoners had been brutally treated and even
brainwashed during the Korean War was the theme of several Hollywood movies, the
most famous of which is The Manchurian Candidate (1962). Starring Frank Sinatra, it
only added to the public’s confusion about the brainwashing allegations. Based on
Richard Condon’s novel of the same name published in 1959, only five years after the
majority of American prisoners had been released, the movie depicted the participation
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of Chinese and Soviet military officers and medical personnel in the brainwashing of a
captured American patrol. One of the soldiers was “programmed” to follow the
instructions of his captors at a later date. The soldier returned to the United States to
receive the Medal of Honor and eventually received orders to kill a presidential
nominee by his American handler, who was none other than his own mother. The
message seemed to be clear: the Communists had diabolical techniques for transforming
American soldiers into willing instruments of their nefarious plans. Sinatra purchased
the rights to the film a year later when President John Kennedy was assassinated in
order to remove it from circulation. Lee Harvey Oswald’s Communist ties were too
similar to the movie’s plot for most Americans. However, the movie was re-released
twenty-five years later to both critical and popular acclaim.
The arguments that the POW’s who refused repatriation had been Communist
sympathizers, “bad” to begin with, or that they had been brainwashed, do not
adequately answer all questions. If the Communists did develop a “brainwashing”
technique, why did it succeed in convincing only twenty-one of the over 4,000 prisoners
to remain in North Korea? There was no evidence that all twenty-one had left-wing
sympathies prior to going to Korea. Although most had collaborated with the
Communists during their captivity, their observations, both before and after capture, of
life under a Communist regime should have enlightened them to the fact that the worst
American military prison was better than the standard of living experienced by civilians
in North Korea. None of the easy answers explain why the twenty-one arrived at the
neutral zone where the repatriation process began, singing the “Internationale” and
telling the press that they wanted to stay in North Korea where, “there is no
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contradiction between what is preached and what is practiced – a society where there is
freedom for our ideas,” and that “we know that our stand against America’s aggressive
war policy is the real stand of the American people.”81
The United States continued to attempt to persuade the soldiers that repatriation
was in their best interest. A team of U.S. “explainers” remained at the neutral zone
until Christmas, 1953, waiting to have an opportunity to speak with the young
Americans.82 When the soldiers refused to leave the Communist barracks and speak
with the Americans, the “explainers” provided Lieutenant General K. S. Thimayya of
the Indian Army, the officer in charge of the repatriation station, a twelve-page letter to
pass on to them.
Newsweek magazine contacted the family members of the twenty-one who
stayed behind to ask questions prepared by “important neuropsychiatrists.”83 The
resultant article appeared in the “Medicine” portion of the magazine and purported to be
a scientific study. The questions asked were:

What kind of community and culture does he come from?
Race?
Religion?
Martial status of parents?
Size of family?
Is he eldest or youngest?
Any unusual or prolonged illness in family?
Any insanity?
How far did he go in school?
How did he get along with other people?
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Did he like sports? Girls?
Was he a happy child? Any unusual behavior? Was he easily led?
Some of the questions appear to have no relevance at all in providing answers as to why
the soldier refused repatriation. The fact that a soldier did or did not like sports or girls
seems irrelevant. The article made a point of illustrating that only three of the men
were married, that only a few had steady girl friends, and that six of them had “virtually
no interest in sports,” implying that they were not red-blooded American men. The
investigation reflected the widespread public belief that there was something inherently
wrong with the twenty-one POW’s rather than any shortcoming on the part of American
society.
Some of the questions did seem to be relevant. Brigadier General R.E.
Chambers, chief Army psychiatrist, gave his “personal viewpoint,” based on the
answers provided for the questions:

If some of these boys are under-privileged, as some reports say, this might be a
factor. A lack of purpose, and the failure of the family situation to develop good
work habits, good social feeling, and a sense of responsibility to one’s social
group can cause trouble, whatever the economic level. Such men’s evaluation of
a situation would be based on what they are getting out of it compared to what
they got out of their hometown. All this might render people vulnerable to
propaganda approaches – even though experience has shown that many other
under-privileged people are not vulnerable.

In any case, “What will be the military future of the soldiers who stayed behind with the
Reds?”84 Newsweek – and the nation – wondered. Secretary of Defense Wilson
supplied the answer on January 25, 1954, when he ordered that all twenty-one be
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dropped from the rolls with dishonorable discharges.85 But that decision was contrary
to military law. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a soldier could receive a
dishonorable discharge only as a part of a sentence received at a general court-martial.
The first three of the twenty-one who returned to the United States brought suit against
the United States for back pay. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the three
ex-prisoners and awarded them over $9,000.86
Although no single answer explains why twenty-one American POW’s would
choose to remain in a Communist country, their choice to do so contributed to the ever
growing discussion in the United States regarding Army policy and the POW
experience. The publication of Eugene Kinkead's book In Every War But One in 1959,
after selections had appeared in The New Yorker magazine in 1957, fueled the debate.
Kinkead originally asked the Army for permission to report on the official investigation
into POW’s in 1954, while the investigation was still ongoing, but the Army refused
permission until the investigation was completed.87 Kinkead reported that he had
received extensive cooperation from the Army and that the Department of Defense
approved his manuscript. His basic premise was that American POW’s had performed
admirably "in every war but one." During the Korean Conflict, he wrote, one out of
every three POW’s collaborated with the enemy, mostly the Chinese. The collaboration
ranged from relatively minor offenses such as broadcasting Christmas greetings home
that mentioned allegedly good treatment from captors to serious offenses, such as
writing anti-American propaganda and informing on their comrades.88
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Kinkead presented a detailed account of the Army’s investigation from its
inception before the end of hostilities through its conclusion, which resulted in the trial
of fourteen servicemen. The investigation first began collecting tapes of the broadcasts
made by American prisoners and the articles that they wrote. The Army, which was the
lead agency for the investigation since the vast majority of the prisoners were soldiers,
also collected information provided by South Korean intelligence agents working
behind enemy lines and American prisoners who had received early release for
propaganda purposes.89 This information led to the creation of questionnaires given to
every prisoner upon release.
A total of 7,190 American were captured during the Korean War. Of these,
6,656 were Army soldiers, 263 were from the Air Force, 213 were from the Marine
Corps, and 40 were from the Navy. 90 A total of 4,435 prisoners had been released or
made their way back to American lines within six months of the signing of the
Armistice in July 1953. The number included 3,973 soldiers, 235 airmen, 196 marines,
and thirty-one from the Navy.91 The released prisoners were divided into three major
groups. The first major group, numbering approximately 650 prisoners, was made up of
three subgroups of soldiers: those prisoners who escaped after having been captured for
only a short period of time; those who had been liberated by combat advances; and
those who had been repatriated for propaganda proposed by the North Koreans. Of the
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first major group, only those repatriated by the North Koreans had any relevant
information to add to the investigation.
The bulk of the post-conflict investigation concentrated on the remaining two
major groups of released prisoners. The second major group, numbering 149 prisoners,
was released during Operation Little Switch in April 1953 and consisted of sick and
wounded prisoners.92 The final major group and last repatriation of prisoners,
Operation Big Switch in August-September 1953, involved 3,629 prisoners.
The Army’s procedure for handling the returning POW’s prior to the Korean
War had been to see that they bathed and received new uniforms and any necessary
medical assistance before being debriefed by military intelligence. But the Korean War
returnees underwent two new steps: they had to undergo a psychiatric examination and
then intelligence questioning that focused on both counterintelligence and military
information, rather than just the latter.93 Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, who was at
that time the Army Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of G-2 (Intelligence), directed the
creation of the intelligence questionnaires.94 This resulted in seventy multi-part
counterintelligence questions, covering forty pages, and forty-four multi-part military
information questions, covering thirty-seven pages.
The Army established ten teams to work with repatriated prisoners. Each team
contained seventy-two specialists headed by a seven-member board that contained one
member each from Army counterintelligence, Army military intelligence, Office of
Naval Intelligence, Air Force Office of Special Investigation, Army Judge Advocate
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General's Corps, a psychiatrist, and a board chairman. The remainder of the team
consisted of military intelligence specialists who administered the questionnaires,
medical and psychiatric personnel to provide care and evaluate the prisoners’ medical
and mental condition, and administrative personnel to handle the vast amounts of
paperwork generated by the investigation.95
Nine of the teams accompanied the returning prisoners on the transport ships
that carried them back to the United States, while the tenth team went to Japan to work
with those soldiers who had been evacuated there for urgent medical treatment. The
Department of Defense explained that its decision to use sea transportation rather than
air was because the time required for the trans-Pacific voyage would “assist, to a large
extent, in the general rehabilitation and improvement” of the former captives.96 The
returnees answered the questionnaires during the three-week journey from Inchon to
San Francisco. Although the interrogators had instructions to treat the prisoners with
understanding and sympathy, they also advised each soldier of his Article 31 rights
against self-incrimination under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.97 The Article 31
advisements almost certainly had some chilling effect on the answers provided by the
prisoners and forewarned them of possible criminal actions planned by the military for
their conduct while in captivity. During the return voyage, the prisoners also received
psychiatric counseling, both in individual and group settings, with a view not only to
helping them adjust, but also to determine which of them had been "brainwashed" by
the Chinese into believing Communist propaganda. These evaluations along with the
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other information would guide the Army in the task of identifying those POW’s who
warranted further investigation.
After the prisoners returned to the United States, the ones who remained in their
respective services were assigned to the military installation nearest to their homes. The
Army, meanwhile, began scrutinizing the data that investigators had gathered for
evidence of collaboration. After determining who warranted further investigation by
cross-referencing the names of those accused of collaborating from each of the
questionnaires, Army specialists assessed each allegation for credibility. They
discounted information that they could not substantiated or charges that appeared to be
self-serving. When accused of collaboration by a number of credible fellow prisoners, a
POW underwent further investigation.
Based on its preliminary investigation, the Army identified 215 soldiers as
warranting further investigation. There was an average of 185 statements made against
each of them; one of them had over 800 accusations.98 The Army also referred the files
of 210 soldiers who had been discharged from the service to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for further investigation. Because of the fear of the spread of communism
in the United States during the 1950s, the government was concerned that some of the
returning prisoners had been “brainwashed” by the Communists and therefore might
pose security risks to the United States.
The Army eventually tentatively approved eighty-two of the 215 case files for
court-martial and sent them to the Army Board on Prisoner of War Collaboration for a
recommendation regarding court-martial. After review by the Assistant Chief of Staff
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(G-1) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of Defense made
the final decision.99 Forty-seven of the eighty-two cases were eventually approved for
court-martial and twelve of them actually went to trial, along with two others tried
before the screening process began.
Not all Americans agreed with Kinkead’s negative characterization of the
conduct of the American POW’s in Korea. Albert Biderman, a senior research
associate of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C., was a project
scientist for the Air Force prisoner of war study conducted after the Korean War. He
was also the Co-Chair of the Air Force Working Group on Survival Training and had
carried out studies of behavior in captivity and other stressful situations. Biderman
strongly disagreed with Kinkead’s assertions that one-third of American POW’s had
collaborated, that the conduct of the prisoners in Korea was worse than that of
American prisoners of other wars, and that a lack of discipline in the military, especially
the Army, and a decadent American society had led to this poor performance by
American troops.
In 1963, Biderman published a response to Kinkead’s book under the title of
March to Calumny.100 His selection of the word calumny, defined as “the act of
uttering false charges or misrepresentations maliciously calculated to damage another's
reputation,” summed up his opinion regarding the treatment of POW’s by Kinkead and
some American political and military leaders.101
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Kinkead, for example, discounted the significance of the disparity between
Army and Marine survival rates in the prison camps, which were 44 percent and 13
percent, respectively.102 Biderman, however, argued that the difference was more a
result of when and where the prisoner had been captured than any other factor.103 Most
of the Army deaths, over 99 percent, occurred within the first year of the war.104 The
prisoners were in the hands of the North Koreans at the time and endured totally
inadequate treatment, caused mainly by the inability or unwillingness of the North
Koreans to provide food and shelter for the POW’s. Later, after China had entered the
war, the treatment of prisoners improved substantially. One-fifth of all Marine
prisoners were captured during the first week of December 1951, during the brutal
engagement against the Chinese, and subsequent withdrawal, at the Chosin Reservoir.
They became part of a model indoctrination camp, which was known by the prisoners
as "Peaceful Valley."105 The mortality rate at "Peaceful Valley" was less than 10
percent, all deaths attributable to injuries existing at capture or suffered in evacuation.
This was substantially less than the rate of 40 percent or more experienced at other
major camps during the same time period.
Biderman also disputed Kinkead's classification of the Turkish POW’s as a
control group. He again pointed out that the time and location of the capture seemed to
be the most critical factor affecting the mortality rate of prisoners. Approximately half
of the Turks had been captured in April 1951 and the mortality rate for the 431
American soldiers captured that same month was only 13 percent a result, again, of the
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improved conditions experienced by the prisoners after the end of the first year of the
war.106 Biderman also attributed the Chinese failure to indoctrinate Turks to the fact
that the Chinese had no Turkish speakers.
Recent scholarship supports Biderman’s conclusions. Raymond Lech’s Broken
Soldiers, published in November 2000, argues that almost every American POW
performed as well as could be expected given the conditions found in the camps.107 He
examines closely the facts surrounding the captivity of the POW’s, concentrating
specifically on those who were later court-martialed, and underscores the terrible
suffering experienced by the prisoners, occasionally at the hands of fellow POW’s.
Punishing those whose only crime consisted of making statements on behalf of the
Communists, attending or proctoring indoctrination classes, or performing other
propaganda tasks at the demand of the Communists, was patently unfair and unrealistic,
Lech maintains. Some soldiers were court-martialed for committing such acts while
others were not. There did not seem to be any consistency to the decisions. Lech also
points out the disparate sentences received by those convicted of collaboration. Major
Ronald Alley was convicted, among other things, of making a speech accusing the
United States of having been the aggressor in Korea and justifying Communist
policy.108 However, several hundred prisoners signed similar statements without being
brought to trial. Major Alley was sentenced to ten years at hard labor for his “crime.”
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Liles was found guilty of aiding, communicating with, and
holding intercourse with the enemy. His sentence was a two-year suspension in rank
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and a reprimand. Although his reprimand was caustic, telling Liles that “[you}
conducted yourself in a servile, craven, and unsoldierly manner for the obvious purpose
of securing favored treatment for yourself while a prisoner of war,”109 it does not
compare to ten years at hard labor.
One result of the national debate over the conduct of POW’s in Korea was an
effort by the military services individually to draft standards for their POW’s to follow.
The services were unable to reach a consensus on the best course of action. The Army
proposed the strictest rules of conduct: a prisoner should give only his name, rank, serial
number and date of birth to his captors. The Air Force wanted a less restrictive policy
that would allow airmen to provide the enemy with unimportant information, one piece
at a time, in order to prevent physical abuse.
The Army felt that a prisoner who gave information beyond that permitted in its
proposal was starting down a slippery slope over which he might have little control.
For example, a prisoner who attempted to argue the advantages of a democracy over
communism would be trying to succeed where highly trained negotiators had failed.
Similarly, the Army judged the tactic of providing “unimportant” information was a
dangerous one since the average soldier could not appreciate how the Communists
might use seemingly harmless information for military and non-military reasons. The
Army also discouraged the tactic of prisoners’ “deceiving their interrogators.” Any
such attempt was unlikely to be successful because the prisoner would have to keep
track of what he previously had told his captors, requiring him to remain mentally
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sharp, a requirement few could meet under Korea-like conditions of internment. More
importantly, the Chinese considered lying to be an offense punishable by death.110
This fundamental disagreement between the Army and Air Force is
understandable. The typical Air Force prisoner of war was a carefully selected and
highly trained officer, whereas the typical Army prisoner of war was a member of a
combat arms unit.111 The two were normally from widely divergent backgrounds and
faced different treatment from their captors. The enemy would expect the Air Force
prisoner to have information which was more sensitive, of greater tactical and strategic
importance, and less likely to become obsolete. The Army ground combat troop was
more likely to be enlisted and have little education or training and almost no
information of either tactical or strategic importance. This understandably led the two
services to different conclusions about proper POW conduct.
The Department of Defense, however, wanted a single policy for all services.
Because of their failure to agree on a single code, Secretary of Defense Wilson on May
18, 1955, established the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of
War.112 Committee membership consisted of five civilians and five retired flag officers,
the latter chosen on the assumption that retired officers would be less partisan to any
one particular service. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower
and Personnel, served as chairman of the group.
The Committee met for almost two months, reviewing all documents collected
during the investigation of Korean POW’s and consulting outside experts. The
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Committee's report listed sixty-seven individuals whom it consulted, but many more
actually appeared before the Committee.113 Among those citizens, former POW’s, and
government representatives who appeared before the Committee were, Father Theodore
Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University, the noted military historian and
editorial writer S.L.A. Marshall, William F. Dean, the Army general who had been a
prisoner of war in Korea, and United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.
The Committee was unique in that its task was to determine a code of conduct
for American POW’s. The vast majority of existing rules and regulations governed the
conduct of the captors rather than of the captives. The Lieber Code, Hague
Conventions, United States military regulations, and most international law of land
warfare directives established standards of treatment and conduct with which a nation
possessing POW’s must comply. The regulations seldom addressed the behavior of the
POW’s themselves and, then usually only in the form of prohibited conduct. For
example, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted on May 31, 1951, during the
midst of the Korean War, had criminalized aiding the enemy and misconduct as a
prisoner.114 The American POW thus knew how not to act, but had little guidance on
how to act when captured. The Committee, however, found no criminal prosecutions in
cases where there had been torture, either mental or physical.115
The Committee presented its findings to the Secretary of Defense in an eightypage report. Out of 7,190 POW’s in Korea, 2,730 had died in prison camps, a 38
percent death rate and the worst since the American Revolution. Kinkead attributed that
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attrition in large part to “give-up-itis, ” an affliction that seemed to result in men willing
themselves to die.116 He bases that conclusion on his interviews with Major Clarence
Anderson, an Army doctor captured by the North Koreans on November 3, 1950.
Anderson provided medical care for the men in his prison camp and cited a lack of
discipline as a primary cause of the problem. He also believed that a better developed
sense of social responsibility and adherence to the “Golden Rule,” i.e. treating others as
a person would like to be treated, would help prevent this high mortality rate from
occurring in a similar situation.117
Biderman does not disagree that a lack of will to live led to many deaths during
the Korean War. In any case, he points out the phenomenon was not new with regard to
POW’s. The same affliction was known as “around-the-bends” at Andersonville, and
“fatal surrender” or “bamboo disease” in the Philippines.118 Biderman does disagree
with Major Anderson’s assertion that social conscience and the Golden Rule are helpful
in these situations. He alludes to a number of writers who found that, in concentration
camps where people were dying of want or oppression, survival might depend on
sharply curbing altruistic impulses or not having them in the first place.119
The Committee concluded that American leadership had broken down in the
prison camps, resulting in an “every man for himself” situation that eroded discipline,
allowing the strong to hoard food and persecute the sick and weak. It also permitted
unsanitary conditions that led to disease and contagion. The Committee also found that
Turkish POW’s had done much better than American POW’s. The Committee
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attributed this to the Turks’ being a rugged race of people, the enforcement of strict
discipline within their group, and the language barrier that hindered interrogation by the
North Koreans.
One of the most interesting findings of the Committee was that a large number
of American prisoners, because they understood little about either Communism or
Americanism, had been at a disadvantage when debating with their Communist
interrogators. Too many American soldiers did not understand the basic principles for
which America stood, and correspondingly, which they represented. General John E.
Hull, U.S. Army, (Retired), who had been the commander of forces in the Far East
during the Korean War and served as an acting chairman of the Defense Committee that
had written the Code of Conduct, gave particular emphasis to that point. “I feel
strongly that we are derelict in our schools in teaching the youth of this nation enough
about what we stand for and what communism stands for,” he declared. “I have a very
firm belief that the youth of this nation, if they fully understood the Communist system,
would never question our system.”120 In the Committee’s view, the government’s
failure to identify adequately its objective during the Korean War had exacerbated that
lack of understanding. The Committee characterized the Korean War as having been
(1) a civil war (2) an exercise in collective security, with the United Nations attempting
to stop an aggressor and (3) a “Cold War” problem, with the Western powers blocking
the expansion of Communist imperialism.121 Because the American public and a
majority of servicemen did not know why the United States intervened in Korea, there
was no sense of duty to participate like that found during World War II. If the
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American public had better understood the importance of the Korean War in stopping
the spread of communism, it might have provided stronger support for the soldiers
fighting the war. The Committee urged that the Government, churches, schools, and
families combine to build "spiritual and educational bulwarks against enemy political
indoctrination."122
The Committee's culminating achievement was the development of the sixparagraph Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States,
purposely drafted in simple language in order to be understood by all soldiers. The
Committee believed that soldiers would perform better if they were aware of what was
expected of them.
The Committee also provided explanatory notes, both before and after each
paragraph of the Code, to explain its rationale. The notes, which normally do not
accompany the Code when it is posted, are essential for understanding what the
Committee expected of American service members. Both the original and current Code
of Conduct, along with the explanatory notes, are included as Appendixes.
The Code of Conduct provides direction to the soldier who is captured. It
informs the soldier, in specific terms, of the standard of behavior expected of all
POW’s. The choice of the word “will,” used on multiple occasions in five of the six
paragraphs, imposes a duty on POW’s to do, or restricts them from doing, certain
things. The duties and restrictions are generally tempered by language that allows the
POW to decide when it is not necessary to adhere to the Code. For example, the Code
imposes restrictions on commanders and soldiers concerning surrender. Both groups
are prohibited from surrendering while they have the means to resist, “I will never
122
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surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while
they still have the means to resist.”123 The inclusion of the words “while they still have
the means to resist” allows the commander to determine when surrender is authorized.
The explanatory note to Paragraph II, however, extends this duty to not only “resist” but
also to “evade,” and directs that a soldier who is no longer capable of inflicting
casualties on the enemy has a duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly
forces.124
The duties imposed by the Code also allow for some interpretation by the POW
of what is required of him. Soldiers are required to provide his name, rank, service
number and date of birth and to “evade answering further questions to the utmost of my
ability.”125 This allows for evaluation of each soldier’s situation and judgment based
upon the merits of those specific facts.
A POW is expected to attempt to escape and assist in the escape attempts of
others. “If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make
every effort to escape and aid others to escape.”126 The POW decides what means are
available and which efforts are worthy. The Explanatory Note directs that resistance
should continue. “The fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp.”127 This
requirement is based on sound military strategy. The more soldiers the enemy must
employ to guard POW’s, the fewer he will have available for other duties. In this way,
POW’s can continue to contribute to the war effort.
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Although entirely appropriate at the time of its creation, President Reagan
amended Paragraphs I, II, and VI in 1988. The Code’s gender-specific language, such
as “I am an American fighting man,”128 was changed to a gender-neutral description of
the American soldier “I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my county
and our way of life,” to reflect the change in demographics the American military
experienced, beginning in the mid-1970s.
Nowhere in the Code itself does it purport to be a punitive document, that is,
that violations of the Code are subject to punishment. However, the explanatory notes
following Paragraph VI make it clear the military intends for the provisions of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, whenever appropriate, to continue to apply to
members of the armed forces while they are POW’s.
The Secretary of Defense quickly ordered the services to begin training their
troops to live up to the new Code of Conduct. He also directed subordinates to seek to
win “wide public support” for the Code and to enlist the aid of other Federal agencies,
schools, churches, industry, labor and agriculture. In a second order, he directed that
service members be educated in the basic advantages of democracy and the fallacies of
communism.129
Within days of the release of the Code of Conduct, the American public,
political figures and the media began evaluating it. A New York Times editorialist
called it “thoughtful, literate, acute in observation and free from some of the
‘officialese’ that too often characterizes finding of this sort.”130 He noted with approval
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that the Code went beyond a set of rules for POW’s to follow and projected a concept of
citizenship for all Americans, which public and private institutions should seek
systematically to inculcate in the nation’s youth.
Colonel Carl E. Williamson of the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps
supported the Code, but questioned whether the Secretary of Defense’s mandate to
coordinate with civilian institutions to provide better understanding of American ideals
was possible, or even desirable.131 The Army had the task of taking a recruit as it found
him and turning him into a soldier, Williamson asserted, and it was too much to expect
the services to assume the obligations of civilian institutions or venture too far into their
domain, something the public would not support regardless.
Senator Estes Kefauver, a Democrat from Tennessee, was quick to criticize the
Code. He thought it fine in principle but questioned its use in dire time. “It occurs to
me that the Code of Conduct for the future proposed in this report is a fine patriotic set
of principles, which are excellent and highly beneficial for club conditions,” he said.
“But I wonder how they would serve the man exhausted by battle, hungry, cold, facing
hostile interrogators and the prospect of more suffering and unknown dangers.” And
what about young soldiers from rural communities who had little formal education and
were therefore especially susceptible to Communist interrogation, Kefauver wondered.
Should they be prosecuted? He suggested that the Communists surely had informed
American POW’s of the criticism of the Korean War by many people in America,
including some members of the government. That criticism, such as characterizing the
war as a “useless war” or “Truman’s war,” along with the disputes over America’s
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unclear objectives had surely reached the prisoners and affected their ability to resist
Communist propaganda. 132
A more extreme criticism came from the Very Reverend Francis J. Connell,
dean of the School of Sacred Theology of the Catholic University of America, who
objected that the Code and the report on which it was based “naively suppose the
United States in war will always be on the right side.” Americans, he urged, should
reject the axiom “My Country, Right or Wrong.”133
Regardless of how Americans felt, the new Code of Conduct set a standard that
the military expected POW’s to live by. Although American POW’s had followed
many of the rules for almost 200 years, this was the first time that the government had
written the rules down. Many in the military community recognized the significance of
that step. “The fact that it was necessary to spell out what had always been taken for
granted by Americans as constituting the unquestioned duties and obligations of the
fighting man indicated how greatly the Korean War differed from the seven major wars
that this nation had previously fought.”134 It would not take long to determine how well
the Code of Conduct would serve POW’s. Less than ten years after President
Eisenhower's Executive Order 10631, American servicemen would put it to the test in
the jungles of Vietnam.
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN POW’S IN VIETNAM
America began its longest war very slowly. The United States government
considered South Vietnam a critical bastion against Communism in Asia. The Army
initially deployed a limited number of American troops to the Southeast Asian country
as advisors to the anti-communist government. This role gradually expanded until
American ground troops were conducting the majority of the combat operations against
the Communist forces. Before the end of the war, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(North Vietnam) held over 500 American servicemen captive. Several remained
POW’s for over eight years and one endured more than nine years of captivity.135
During these extended periods of confinement, the POW’s learned that very few could
rigidly follow the Code. Most adopted a flexible approach to the Code that allowed
them to cooperate with the enemy when failure to do so would result in permanent,
physical injury. This approach was more similar to that proposed by the Air Force
during the development of the Code of Conduct. The fact that a majority of the POW’s
during the Vietnam War were Air Force and Naval aviators lends credence to the Air
Force argument that a less rigid Code would work for the more educated, career
members of its service. It does not, however, necessarily indicate that the same
approach would have been as successful had the majority of POW’s been young,
enlisted soldiers or Marines.
The POW’s captured during the Vietnam War were much different from their
Korean War counterparts. The "typical" prisoner in Korea had been a private first class,
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less than twenty-three years old, with a median education of less than nine years. The
average score on the Army General Classification Test had been 89, far below the
average for the Army as a whole. Of the POW’s in Korea, 98 percent had been
captured in the initial six months of the fighting and most had gone to Korea from
postwar occupation force duty in Japan.136
By contrast, 493 of the 564 military POW’s repatriated at the conclusion of the
American involvement in Vietnam were officers. Their average age at the time of
capture was almost thirty, they typically had completed college and were careeroriented aviators.137
Most of the Americans captured by the Vietnamese understood, in varying
degrees, what the Code of Conduct required of them. But they did not necessarily
comply with it. The North Vietnamese relied much more on physical torture to gain
what they wanted than the Chinese had during the Korean War. Consequently, almost
all of the prisoners held by the North Vietnamese gave more information than name,
rank, service number and date of birth. One of the important things revealed by
Vietnam-era assessment of the Code was that the North Vietnamese knew it as well, or
even better, than the soldiers they were interrogating. When Army Special Forces First
Lieutenant Nick Rowe escaped in 1968 from his North Vietnamese captors, he took
several enemy documents with him. Some were lessons that the North Vietnamese
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cadre used to teach English, and the last lesson in the series used the Code of Conduct
as a learning device.138
The knowledge the North Vietnamese had of the Code of Conduct was
invaluable to their efforts to break the will of American POW’s. Because they knew
how the American prisoners were supposed to act in all situations, the North
Vietnamese were able to use the prisoner's own Code of Conduct to point out his
"failures," those occasions on which he apparently had violated it. They would then try
to convince the prisoner that, because he had violated the Code once, he would do little
harm in continuing to do so in order to make things better for himself. This led many
prisoners to adopt a "flexible" interpretation of the Code. They reasoned that, although
they could not always uphold its letter, they were upholding its spirit. This allowed
them to avoid some of the guilt the North Vietnamese attempted to use to break a
prisoner's will to resist. Many POW’s convinced themselves that this flexible
interpretation was the only way to provide the Vietnamese with enough information to
prevent punishment and at the same time not harm the American war effort or other
prisoners.
Many prisoners anguished over how to handle interrogations within the
framework of the Code. Some recommended a strict interpretation and believed they
should hang on as long as physically and mentally possible. Others advocated a policy
of deceit and misinformation. Commander Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., the senior ranking
officer in one subdivision of the Hanoi Hilton gave simple instructions to his
subordinates. “No writing. No taping. Die before giving classified information,” he
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admonished. “Take torture until in danger of losing mental faculties, and then give a
phony story. Keep it simple and easy to remember.”139
Prisoners also faced the dilemma that occurred when obeying one provision of
the Code of Conduct meant disobeying another provision. The requirements of
Paragraph III of the Code to continue to resist by all means available, make every effort
to escape, aid others to escape, and accept neither parole nor special favors from the
enemy often presented problems for the prisoners. Escape for the prisoners being held
in Hanoi was a virtual impossibility. Getting out of the prison itself would be only the
first of many obstacles the prisoner would have to accomplish. As Caucasians, they
would be unable to blend into the civilian population. They would have to make their
way hundreds of miles to South Vietnam or travel down the Red River to the coast.
Notwithstanding the dismal chances of success, some did try to escape, citing Paragraph
III as requiring the effort.
On May 10, 1969, two Air Force officers, John A. Dramesi and Edwin L.
Atterberry, escaped from the so-called Hanoi Hilton, the site where the majority of
Americans were held.140 Their escape was the subject of discussion among the other
prisoners prior to the attempt. Some believed they should attempt the escape because
the Code of Conduct called for it and also because they would be able to expose the
substandard treatment prisoners were receiving if they succeeded in rejoining friendly
forces. Other prisoners thought the risks of recapture and possibly death, and of
possible retribution against those who remained behind far outweighed the chances of
the escapees’ reaching friendly lines.
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Dramesi and Atterberry succeeded in slipping out of the prison but they were
captured the next morning at first light – and the fears of those who had opposed the
attempt soon proved justified. Dramesi and Atterberry were immediately isolated and a
month of intense torture began. Dramesi was able later to recount the terrible ordeal,
but Atterberry did not survive the punishment. And the Vietnamese did not stop their
torture with Dramesi and Atterberry. They took twenty-six other prisoners, accused
them of assisting in the escape, and began months of intense torture.141 The
mistreatment was so fierce that many prisoners who had never before collaborated now
wrote autobiographies, letters to people such as Senator William Fulbright commending
his opposition to the war, letters to Ho Chi Minh pleading for amnesty, and taperecorded denunciations of the American intervention in an internal Vietnamese
conflict.142
The lessons learned from this escape attempt created a conflict between the
requirement to make every effort to escape and several other provisions of the Code.
Following the massive reprisal conducted by the Vietnamese, senior officers began to
discourage or absolutely prohibit escape attempts. This created a predicament for the
prisoner because the Code directed him to “make every effort to escape,” but Paragraph
IV also required he “obey the lawful orders” of his superiors and “back them up in
every way.” Several senior-ranking officers directed that escape attempts be curtailed
or totally halted because of fear of what the Vietnamese would do in retaliation. That
paragraph also required a POW not to “take part in any action which might be harmful
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to my comrades.” As the Dramesi – Atterberry episode showed, an escape attempt
could indeed prove “harmful” to fellow prisoners.
Seaman Doug Hegdahl faced another conflicting requirement in August, 1969.
Hegdahl had been captured in April 1967 after falling overboard from the U.S.S.
Canberra as it shelled the Vietnamese coast.143 When the North Vietnamese offered
Hegdahl parole, Lieutenant Commander Richard Stratton ordered him to accept the
early release. Stratton did this partly because Hegdahl had memorized the names of 260
American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. When Hegdahl protested against early
release, Stratton did not mince words. “I am giving you a direct order,” he told the
seaman. “You will go home and you will take this information out of here if you get
the opportunity to go home with honor.”144
The Vietnamese put immense pressure on the American POW’s to make
statements for their cause. The statements were usually confessions of crimes against
the Vietnamese people, or appeals for American soldiers to refuse to fight against the
Vietnamese people, or expressions of thanks for alleged humane treatment. The
Vietnamese promised the ultimate reward for those soldiers who were “re-educated”
and provided the statements: they would be released so they could return to the United
States and spread this message. Those who refused “re-education” by failing to write
acceptable statements were deprived of the basic necessities for survival and told they
would remain in captivity until they accepted the truth. First Lieutenant Rowe
experienced five years of this “re-education.” His refusal to accept the Communist
propaganda and write the desired statements resulted in his continued confinement. In
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1967, after Rowe had spent four years in captivity, the three other American POW’s
who shared his jungle prison were released, leaving him alone. He wrote that he was
terrified of staying in captivity until he died, a fear reinforced by a cadre who told him,
“Do not think that merely because the war ends that you will go home. You can rest
here after the war.”145 Rowe eventually did write a statement, agreeing with the cadre
that if the war was progressing as he was told, the U.S. position in South Vietnam was
weaker than he had ever thought possible and the National Liberation Front was on the
path to victory.146 He wrote after three nights of sleeping in the open, without shirt,
pants or mosquito netting. Once he made the statement, his captors immediately
returned his clothing, blanket and mosquito netting. This was a common tactic of the
Vietnamese, using the “carrot and stick” to get what they wanted.
Lieutenant Rowe was an example of the POW who could not articulate well the
principles underlying the American system. When faced with Communist propaganda
against the United States, he found himself unable to define clearly the concepts of
liberty, equality and justice and their basis for the American form of government.147
This became even more difficult when interrogators confronted him with statements
condemning the war from prominent Americans, such as Senators J. William Fulbright
and Mike Mansfield.148
Although his captors never used physical torture to force Nick Rowe to
collaborate, other POW’s were not so fortunate. Lieutenant Commander John McCain
III was beaten for four days before confessing, “I am a black criminal and I have
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performed the deeds of an air pirate. I almost died and the Vietnamese people saved my
life. The doctors gave me an operation that I did not deserve.”149 He later described the
two weeks following his forced confession as the worst period of his life. His despair
was intense and he recalled worrying about whether or not his father had heard of his
“disgrace.”150
McCain, the son of Admiral John McCain Jr., who became the Commander in
Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific while his son was in captivity, had refused early
release in order to deprive the enemy of the propaganda value of releasing an admiral’s
son. The Vietnamese wanted to demonstrate to the other POW’s and the world that the
Code of Conduct, and its restrictions, did not apply to all American prisoners.
American POW’s were not the only ones who made untruthful statements. In
January 1968, North Korean authorities seized the United States Navy intelligence ship
Pueblo in the waters off the North Korean coast. The United States Government made
a fictitious confession about the Pueblo's mission and actions, and then repudiated it (as
tacitly arranged with the North Koreans) after the Pueblo crewmembers had returned.151
The Government's actions during the Pueblo incident, it can be argued, compromised
the credibility of the Code of Conduct by giving the appearance that the Code of
Conduct required standards from service members that the Government did not have to
meet. "It would be unjust to expect an American PW [sic] to rigidly adhere to the
Spartan Code of Conduct when the United States abandoned it in dealing with the North
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Koreans,” one critic wrote. “To expect a soldier to conform to a higher standard of
conduct than his country would not only be unrealistic but also unreasonable."152
Not all American POW’s gave statements to the Vietnamese. Air Force Captain
Lance Sijan refused to bow to the Vietnamese or compromise his strict interpretation of
the Code of Conduct. He evaded capture for six weeks after being shot down in
November 1967 and, once he fell captive, attempted to escape. Despite repeated torture
sessions, he refused to make statements of any kind. Other prisoners heard him tell his
interrogators, “Don’t you understand? I’m not going to tell you anything. I can’t talk to
you. It’s against the Code.”153 He died without ever providing any information other
than the bare essentials allowed by the Code of Conduct.
Captain Sijan wasn’t the only American prisoner of war to die for his strict
adherence to Code of Conduct. Army Captain Humbert “Rocky” Versace was captured
with First Lieutenant Nick Rowe while serving as an advisor to the South Vietnamese
Army in 1963. Versace spoke both Vietnamese and French and would argue with the
cadre in all three languages. Rowe once heard Versace tell a cadre member during a
“re-education” session, “I’m an officer in the United States Army. You can force me to
come here, you can make me sit and listen, but I don’t believe a damn word of what you
say.” On September 26, 1965, the Vietnamese executed Versace, along with Sergeant
Kenneth M. Roraback ostensibly in retaliation for the execution of three Vietcong
“patriots” in Danang.154 Captain Versace continued to refuse to make statements until
his murder, strictly adhering to his understanding of the Code of Conduct.
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Some American prisoners did go beyond only making statements under the
duress of torture. Some began actively collaborating with the Vietnamese in return for
better treatment. They received better food than the other prisoners and enjoyed more
freedom of movement. Some collaborated because of fear of torture or death at the
hands of the Vietnamese. Whatever their motivation, their conduct went beyond that of
only giving in when personal collapse seemed imminent. These prisoners adopted a
policy of active collaboration, doing anything that their Vietnamese captors demanded.
Some of the collaborators informed on fellow prisoners. When Lieutenant
Commander John McCain attempted to introduce himself to two of them, in violation of
the camp commander’s “no communication” policy, they immediately summoned the
guard, who struck McCain for his disobedience.155 The “Peace Clowns”, the name
given to the eight American prisoners who collaborated at the Plantation Camp of the
Hanoi Hilton, also responded by informing the guards when Captain Ed Leonard
ordered them to stop collaborating with the enemy. Within an hour of his having given
them the order, guards took Leonard from his cell and placed him in leg stocks in
solitary confinement, where he spent the next eight months.156
Military authorities were unsure how to deal with returning prisoners. In 1968,
First Lieutenant Nick Rowe was read his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, before he was debriefed less than twenty-four hours after his escape.
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Article 31 affords members of the military the right to remain silent during official
questioning and is similar to the rights afforded civilians by the Miranda warning.
Rowe later stated that the sense of freedom disappeared with that warning: he was once
again alone with his interrogators.157
The attitude of the military had changed by the time the Vietnamese released all
known prisoners in 1973. No action had been taken against any who had accepted early
release, although the Code of Conduct prohibited acceptance of parole. Secretary of
Defense Melvin R. Laird had decreed that any alleged offenses by any prisoner of war
during the time of his captivity were to be forgiven.158 But that did not prevent
individual prisoners from making their own charges against prisoners they felt had
collaborated. Air Force Colonel Theodore W. Guy preferred charges against the eight
Peace Clowns from the Plantation Camp for aiding the enemy, disrespect to a superior
officer, disobeying a superior officer, conspiracy and carrying out a conspiracy. After
one of them committed suicide, Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway dismissed
the charges against the five who were members of the Army. “We must not overlook
the good behavior of these men during the two to three years each spent under brutal
conditions in South Vietnam, before they were moved to the north…,” he explained.
“[T]hey had a very hard time, and they behaved admirably during this period.”159 The
Secretary of the Navy, John W. Warner, then dismissed the charges against the
remaining two, who were Marines. His justification was that they had suffered
“deprivations and maltreatment.”160
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The senior Navy returnee, Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, preferred charges
against Navy Captain Walter E. Wilber and Marine Colonel Edison W. Miller for
mutiny, aiding the enemy, conspiracy, soliciting other prisoners to violate the Code of
Conduct, and causing or attempting to cause insubordination and disloyalty. After a
three-month investigation, Secretary Warner dismissed the charges, although he found
merit in them. His justification was that the ensuing court-martial trials would be
unduly disruptive to the lives of the other returnees who would have to testify and the
lives of their families. Both officers received letters of censure for failing to meet the
standards of officers of the Armed Forces of the United States and were forced to
retire.161 Although the two men were the prisoners who had informed on John
McCain’s attempt to communicate with them, McCain was not disappointed by the
decision to drop the charges against them. The memory of their treachery, he thought,
would be punishment enough.162
Although the Code of Conduct did not prove to be a panacea for all issues faced
by POW’s in Vietnam, it did provide the majority of those held captive with guidelines
by which to conduct themselves. The POW’s learned to adapt the Code to fit the reality
with which they were faced. The lengthy periods of confinement many of the POW’s
remained prisoners also proved to be a challenge. Strictly adhering to the Code during
the years of torture and deprivation was more than most could achieve.
The experiences of American POW’s in Vietnam afforded the military a
valuable opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct under the
conditions for which it was created. The POW’s, most college educated officers, had
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learned first-hand those parts of the Code which were contradictory or impractical. The
information they possessed could have been used to change to the Code in order to
make it more useful to future POW’s. The military did not take advantage of the
opportunity, though. The war in Vietnam had taken a heavy toll on all of the services.
The challenge of simply fielding a force that was capable of defending the United States
was such that many of the lessons of Vietnam were not immediately exploited. The
American public and military wanted to forget about Vietnam and turn its attention on
other issues such as the Cold War. It would be years before the military would utilize
the lessons learned in Vietnam.
In the early 1980’s, the Army addressed the need for an intensive training
program for those soldiers whose military specialty increased their chance of becoming
a POW. The military identified pilots, aviation crewmembers, and those assigned to
special operations units as examples of those who should receive the specialized
training. During planning of the course, the Army chose to make the most of lessons
learned in Vietnam by selecting Lieutenant Colonel Nick Rowe to establish the entire
training regime. Although he had left the Army in 1974, Rowe was recalled to active
duty in 1981 specifically for this task. The result was the United States Army Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School. The school, which continues to train
soldiers from all branches of the military, provides instruction generally on a variety of
topics faced by servicemen behind enemy lines and specifically on the Code of Conduct
and how the Code can provide support to POW’s. The Air Force and Navy also have
established SERE schools to train its members in aspects that are more relevant to their
mission. Although the SERE school provides excellent training, its availability to only
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a select few leaves a majority of the military without the advanced training necessary to
achieve the full benefit of the Code of Conduct.
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CONCLUSION
In the forty-six years since the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of the
United States appeared, the global political climate has changed dramatically. The
collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990’s virtually eliminated the threat of world
domination by the Communists. The Code, created in response to perceived failures of
American POW’s when confronted with Communist indoctrination, must now provide
direction and inspiration to service members faced with very different threats.
American service members have experienced captivity on a limited scale since
the Vietnam War. One major difference is that their length of captivity is significantly
shorter than that experienced by POW’s of all of America’s major conflicts. As such,
their experiences have differed somewhat from those POW’s. Many of the more recent
POW’s did not face issues addressed by earlier POW’s such as escape, parole, and the
necessity of taking command because of the short duration of their imprisonment.
Army Major Rhonda Cornum was one of, if not the, first American female
service member to be shot down and captured while flying on a combat mission. She
was a flight surgeon on a combat search-and-rescue mission during the Gulf War when
Iraqi fire brought down the Utility Helicopter (UH) – 60 Blackhawk in which she was
flying. She remained a prisoner of war for eight days. Although she had arrived in
Saudi Arabia on August 25, 1990, and was not shot down until February 27, 1991, she
had received no Code of Conduct training beyond that given thirteen years earlier
during her officer basic training course.163 The only thing she remembered from that
training was that she should not accept favors from the enemy and she should not do
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anything to hurt her fellow prisoners or her mission. Although she was never tortured
or beaten, an Iraqi guard sexually assaulted her. She was released at the end of the Gulf
War.
Army Chief Warrant Officer Three Michael Durant used the Code to sustain him
during his captivity by a Somali warlord in October 1993. He suffered a broken back, a
compound fracture of his right leg and a broken cheekbone during a firefight that cost
the lives of eighteen American soldiers. Chief Durant said of the Code of Conduct,
"It's important to know what's in it and what you should and should not do, and to live
by it -- and up to it."164
Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady said the Code of Conduct gave him the will to
survive and evade capture for six days following the downing of his F-16 fighter by a
surface-to-air missile over Bosnia in 1995. O'Grady found that the Code a constant
reminder that, although he was alone behind enemy lines, he "was still part of a team
working to get me out, and I had to do my part."165
On March 31, 1999, members of the Serbian armed forces captured three
American soldiers patrolling in Macedonia near the border of the former Yugoslavia.166
Specialist Steven Gonzales, Staff Sergeant Christopher Stone, and Staff Sergeant
Andrew Ramirez remained in custody for more than a month and Stone left his captors
a note thanking them for the treatment he received.167 Arguably, this was a violation of
the Code prohibition to make no statements disloyal to his country or its allies or
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harmful to their cause. If the Army ever disciplined Stone for this violation, its action
was not made public. All three soldiers subsequently chose to leave the military.
Because of the short durations of captivity American POW’s have endured since
the Vietnam War, their experiences are of limited use in evaluating the Code of
Conduct. A strict prohibition on divulging any information other than the basics might
be realistic for a soldier who is held for only a few days or week, but the same
guidelines will not prove as successful for a soldier who is held for captive for years.
The brief incidents of captivity of POW’s since Vietnam have not produced any
conclusive lessons learned, subsequently, most of the current instruction involving the
Code of Conduct is based on experiences from Vietnam.
Army Regulation 350-30 regulates Code of Conduct training in the United
States Army.168 The regulation requires that study of the Code of Conduct be included
in the program of instruction at the entry-level, i.e., basic training and all courses of
instruction designed to produce officers.169 Subsequent training of the Code is broken
down into three levels: Levels A, B, and C. The appropriate level of training should be
determined for each soldier. Considerations include: risk of capture, risk of exploitation
for information of intelligence value and propaganda purposes, the captor's or detaining
power's assessment of the captive's usefulness and value, military occupational
specialty, unit assignment, rank, or security clearance level.170
The three levels of training are based upon the considerations above. Level A
training is initial entry-level training included in the program of instruction at basic
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training and at all courses of instruction designed for officers. Level B training is for
officer and enlisted personnel or anyone whose duties require them to operate (or are
anticipated to operate) forward of the division rear boundary and up to the forward line
of own troops (FLOT). Level C training is for soldiers whose wartime position, duties,
or assignment has a high risk of capture and whose position, rank, or seniority makes
them vulnerable to greater than average exploitation efforts by a captor. Examples
include personnel who operate forward of the FLOT such as special forces, pathfinders,
selected aviators, flying crew members, and members of ranger battalions.171
One of the problems with the Army’s current Code of Conduct training is that
the modern battlefield makes almost all soldiers potential POW’s. Even during
instances of conventional warfare, the ability of armor units to move over 100 miles a
day and airborne and air assault units even further has extended the depth of the
battlefield as never before. Because of this, it would be prudent that all soldiers receive
at least Level B training after being assigned to their first unit.
A greater shortcoming concerns the threat of being taken prisoner during
peacekeeping operations or by terrorists when there is no ongoing operation. This
scenario puts all soldiers at risk and often the importance placed on security is lessened
during these times. The belief that the threat is low and a high operational tempo
contribute to Code of Conduct training being placed low on the list of the many
priorities units and soldiers must accomplish. This is especially true for non-combat
soldiers and soldiers assigned to non-combat units. The belief that they will never be
taken prisoner is hard to overcome.
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Even in times of war, refresher training on the Code is not guaranteed, as MAJ
Cornum found out during Operation Desert Storm. As a flight surgeon, she met a
majority of the considerations to receive Level C training. However, she received no
additional training during the six months between the time she arrived in Saudi Arabia
and the day she was shot down.172
Military leaders still wrestle with many of the issues addressed by the committee
that drafted the Code. In March 1998, General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, commented on the Code of Conduct and a service members’ obligations
under it. He made his remarks in discussing a possible military confrontation with Iraq
and the possibility that the Iraqis might torture American service members into
collaborating. Shelton said he opposed liberalizing the Code of Conduct. He explained
his rationale by saying,

“Let’s say this is going to be a week or 10-day or 14-day
campaign and he goes down the first day, and he tells
everything he knows about it, and he knew an awful lot
about it that could result in a heck of a lot of casualties far
above him. So I think the principle up front ought to be
name, rank, serial number et cetera and not divulge the
mission and not divulge the concept of operations and hold
out on that for as long as you possibly can.”173

His opinion is consistent with that of Army leaders in 1955 and one that demonstrates
the continuing difference with the Air Force, which still insists on a POW’s right to do
and say almost anything to avoid permanent physical injury.
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American forces are now more likely to conduct peace operations and military
operations other than war than they are to engage in mid-to-high intensity conflicts. In
other words, the United States typically will deploy troops in situations where there has
been no declaration of war and Washington has not officially designated any forces as
hostile. This means that the enemy may consist of individuals or groups who are not
the regular military of any legitimate government and who are unlikely to observe the
laws of war, including those applicable to the treatment of POW’s. This makes it
essential that American service members have a Code of Conduct that addresses this
scenario and that they also receive training to prepare them to meet the challenges they
may face if they become POW’s.
When the adversary is an ill-trained, poorly disciplined irregular force,
American troops can almost certainly expect to experience physical torture if captured.
The lessons from Vietnam illustrate that almost every prisoner, regardless of his desire
or determination, can be forced to comply with his captor's demands through the use of
physical torture. The response adopted by most prisoners in Vietnam, which was to
give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth unless faced with torture that
endangered life or might cause serious injury, should be the standard taught to all
service members. While giving the prisoner a bright line rule outlining the information
he should attempt to limit himself to divulging, it allows each individual to determine
when this is no longer possible without risking either death or serious bodily injury.
Stephen S. Jackson, assistant general counsel of the Defense Department when the Code
of Conduct was drafted, compared the Code to the Ten Commandments. “The Ten
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Commandments set high standards,” he pondered. “At times they are violated, but no
one would suggest that we abandon or change them.”174
The threat of coordinated mental or psychological torture is less likely than
physical mistreatment when dealing with an irregular opponent. However, American
forces must receive training in dealing with the mental and emotional trauma inherent in
any prisoner of war situation. They must understand there are many ways to ensure
their success while in captivity. One is that an in-place, functioning chain of command
is an absolute necessity. The lack of a chain of command during the Korea War
contributed significantly to the incidence of collaboration with the enemy. This is in
stark contrast to the experiences of American POW’s in Vietnam. The existence of a
command structure at the Hanoi Hilton was a major factor in the success of the POW’s,
some of whom were held as long as eight years. The chain of command provides
POW’s with an infrastructure with which they are familiar. It forces senior personnel to
provide for the welfare of their subordinates and provides a mechanism for the
enforcement of discipline. It also provides the psychological advantage of making
prisoners feel that they are still a part of a unit that faces a collective challenge.
The Code of Conduct is not a solution for all the woes of POW’s. Those
unfortunate enough to be captured have always, and will always, face the necessity of
making decisions that would be unthinkable under any other circumstances. The Code
of Conduct provides a standard of behavior for American service members to strive to
uphold. It also imposes duties and responsibilities on them during their captivity.
In order to be effective, however, service members must receive realistic,
mission-specific Code of Conduct training. This training must be more than simply
174
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reading the six paragraphs to them and expecting each of them to determine
individually what he must do to comply with the Code. Service members should
undergo training as units with vignettes used to compel individuals to respond to the
different situations they may experience in captivity. These exercises should be
conducted periodically, at least twice a year, to maintain readiness and integrate newly
assigned soldiers. Military authorities should constantly modify the training to reflect
the current threats against American servicemen wherever they are operating. The
instructors should include the chain of command along with members of the Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, military attorneys who understand the Code of Conduct and
how it relates to international laws, treaties, and rules of war. Individuals who provide
the training should themselves receive specialized instruction to ensure that they
understand how to communicate the principles of the Code of Conduct. They should
also be able to articulate to service personnel how specific situations affect their
responsibilities under the Code of Conduct. Only then can the Code of Conduct fulfill
its obligation to prepare and assist American service members who find themselves as
POW’s.
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APPENDIX I
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631, AUGUST 17,1955175
Paragraph I
The United States serviceman, by his service is protecting
his nation. Any shirking of this responsibility or unwillingness to
do his full part weakens this defense and invites disaster.
I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which
guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my
life in their defense.
A member of the armed forces is always a fighting man.
As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States
regardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself,
whether in active combat, or as a prisoner of war.
Paragraph II
If individuals and commanders were permitted to surrender
whenever a situation seems to be desperate it would become an
open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command,
I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to
resist.
As an individual, a member of the armed forces can never
voluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can no longer
inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and
rejoin the nearest friendly forces.
The responsibility and authority of a commander never
extends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has
power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off or surrounded, a
unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to rejoin friendly
forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.
Paragraph III
The fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp. When
the use of physical weapons is denied, the mental and moral “will
to resist” must be kept alive in every prisoner.
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If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means
available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to
escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the
enemy.
The duty of a member of the armed forces to continue
resistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by the
misfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Conventions
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949,
pertains, must be explained, and is covered in the training
programs to be carried out by the Services.
Article 82 provides as follows: “A prisoner of war shall be
subject to the law, regulations, and orders in force in the armed
forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be
justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of
any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such law,
regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments
contrary to the provisions of this chapter shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall
declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable,
whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a
member of the forces of the Detaining Powers, such acts shall
entail disciplinary punishment only.
He will escape if able to do so, and will assist others to
escape. Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a
prisoner of war upon his faith and honor, to fulfill stated
conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in
consideration of special privileges – usually release from captivity
or lessened restraint. He will never sign or enter into a parole
agreement.
Paragraph IV
The most despicable act an American can commit is to give
aid and comfort to the enemy by informing or otherwise harming
fellow prisoners. Failure to assume responsibilities commensurate
with rank is equally reprehensible.
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my
fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any
action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I
will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those
appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellow
prisoner, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. POW’s must
avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have
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knowledge of particular value to the enemy, and may therefore be
made to suffer coercive interrogation.
Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without
discipline, camp organization, resistance and even survival may be
impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick
and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned
officers of the United States will continue to carry out their
responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture.
The senior line officer or noncommissioned officer within the
prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume command
according to rank (or precedence) without regard to service. This
responsibility and accountability may not be evaded. If the senior
officer or noncommissioned officer is incapacitated or unable to
act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior.
If the foregoing organization cannot be effected, an
organization of elected representatives as provided for in Articles
79-81, Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of
War, or a clandestine organization or both, will be formed.
Paragraph V
Every service man possesses some important military
information of value to the enemy. By revealing it they may cause
the death of comrades or disaster to their unit, or even the defeat of
major forces of the nation.
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am
bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth.
I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my
ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my
country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the
Geneva Conventions and permitted by this code to disclose his
name, rank, service number and date of birth. A prisoner of war
may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual
health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on
routine matters of camp administration. Oral or written
confessions, true or false, questionnaires, personal history
statements, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other
POW’s, signatures to peace or surrender appeals, self criticisms or
any other oral or written communication on behalf of the enemy or
critical or harmful to the United States, its allies, the armed forces
or other prisoners are forbidden.
It is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to place a
prisoner of war under physical or mental torture or any other form
of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If,
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however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will
endeavor to avoid by every means, the disclosure of any
information, or the making of any statement or the performance of
any action harmful to the interests of the United States or its allies
or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.
Russia and the Communist bloc nations have made a
significant reservation to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention of
1949. Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may be
convicted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors,
loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by these
conventions. Therefore the signing of a confession or the making
of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a
“war criminal” and thus, according to this Communist bloc device,
deny to him any protection under the terms of the Geneva
Conventions, including repatriation until his sentence is served.
Paragraph VI
An American is responsible and accountable for his
actions. Prisoner of war status doesn’t change this nor does it
change the obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to
the principles for which it stands. Throughout his captivity, a
prisoner should look to his God for strength to endure whatever
may befall. He should remember that the United States of America
will neither forget, nor forsake him, and that it will win the
ultimate victory.
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man,
responsible for my action, and dedicated to the principles which
made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United
States of America.
The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
whenever appropriate, continue to apply to members of the armed
forces while they are POW’s. The conduct of prisoners is subject
to examination as to the circumstances of capture and through the
period of detention with due regard for the rights of the individual
and consideration for the conditions of captivity.
A member of the armed forces who becomes a prisoner of
war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country, his
service and his unit. The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He must
never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. POW’s
who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another
in surviving this ordeal.
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APPENDIX II
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12633, MARCH 28, 1988176
Paragraph I
I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country
and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
Paragraph II
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will
never surrender the members of my command while they still have
the means to resist.
Paragraph III
If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I
will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will
accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
Paragraph IV
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow
prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action
which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take
command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed
over me and will back them up in every way.
Paragraph V
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required
to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade
answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make
no oral or written statements disloyal to my country
and its allies or harmful to their cause.
Paragraph VI
I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom,
responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which
made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United
States of America.
176

Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
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